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Taking Arlington to New Heights: The Carrillo-Lopez Decision
Caroline Henneman, Associate Member, Immigration and
Human Rights Law Review
I.

Introduction
Former United States President Donald Trump brought
immigration law into the public’s focus during his presidential
campaign in 2016. “I want to—I’m building a wall…” Trump told
CNN’s Jake Tapper, “...and it’s a wall between Mexico, not another
country…”1 The Trump Administration promised immigration
reform including, but not limited to, a wall spanning the United
States-Mexican border, an increase in Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) agents at the border, and the deportation of
all undocumented immigrants.2 Recent research shows these
promises unduly burdened immigrants from Mexican and Latine
communities.3 In 2013, over 90% of deportations were Latino
1

Jake Tapper, Interview with Donald Trump, Pres. Candidate, CNN (June
3, 2016),
https://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2016/06/03/tapper-to-trump-is-thatnot-the-definition-of-racism/.
2
Nick Corasaniti, A Look at Trump’s Immigration Plan, Then and Now,
THE NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/31/us/politics/donald-trumpimmigration-changes.html.
3
See generally Charles Kamasaki, US Immigration Policy: A Classic,
Unappreciated Example of Structural Racism, BROOKINGS (Mar. 26, 2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/how-we-rise/2021/03/26/us-immigrationpolicy-a-classic-unappreciated-example-of-structural-racism/ (contrasting
the plight Latino migrants face while attempting to obtain legal status in
the United States compared to migrants of European descent and how
immigration law unduly burdens the former). See also Michael D. Shear
& Maggie Haberman, Mexico Agreed to Take Border Actions Months
Before Trump Announced Tariff Deal, THE NEW YORK TIMES (June 8,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/08/us/politics/trump-mexico-deal-tariffs
.html (discussing the agreement Mexico made with the Trump
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noncitizens even though Latinos only comprise about 57% of
noncitizens in the United States.4 Trump’s promise to increase
border patrol and end “catch and release” procedures resulted in
the highest number of apprehensions at the United States-Mexican
border in 2019 in over a decade.5 Guatemalans, Hondurans,
Mexicans, and El Salvadorians accounted for 71% of all
apprehensions, and under Trump’s Title 42 expulsion policy, adult
or family crossings from these countries were immediately
deported to Mexico without deportation order.6 Ultimately, the past
half-decade of decision-making within immigration law has
illuminated large accountability issues within the United States
government in violation of noncitizen’s constitutional rights.

administration to deploy an additional 6,000 national guardsmen to avoid
tariffs up to 25 percent, which accelerated the Migrant Protection
Protocols, which helped reduce the “catch and release” of migrants in the
United States by increasing wait times for asylum-seekers in Mexico).
4
Asad L. Asad, Why Latino Citizens are Worrying More About
Deportation, THE CONVERSATION (April 6, 2020),
https://theconversation.com/why-latino-citizens-are-worrying-more-aboutdeportation-133216.
5
John Gramlich & Luis Noe-Bustamante, What’s Happening at the
U.S.-Mexico Border in 5 Charts, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/01/whats-happening-at-th
e-u-s-mexico-border-in-5-charts/. See also “Catch and Release”:
Frequently Asked Questions, JUSTICE FOR IMMIGRANTS,
https://justiceforimmigrants.org/what-we-are-working-on/immigrant-detent
ion/catch-and-release-frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Oct. 11,
2021) (catch and release is a procedure in which certain immigrants are
apprehended and released into the United States on parole while they
wait from their immigration court hearing rather than detainment or
returned to the country in which they crossed into the United States
from).
6
Id. See also Rising Border Encounters in 2021: An Overview and
Analysis, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Aug. 2, 2021),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/rising-border-encounters-in2021.
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The next section of this article will analyze the evolution of
8 U.S.C § 1326, constitutional protections for noncitizens, the
implications of the plenary power doctrine in immigration law, and
the importance of the Carrillo-Lopez decision. Then, this article
will discuss why the Carrillo-Lopez decision correctly applied the
Arlington Heights standard to review 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and its
refusal to conform to the plenary power doctrine. Lastly, this
article will conclude by encouraging courts to follow the
Carrillo-Lopez decision in further Equal Protection challenges
under the Arlington Heights standard.
II.

Background
The history of American immigration law embodies an
implicit bias towards non-white people. Mexican migrants faced
laws such as “Operation Wetback” in the 1950s, resulting in the
mass deportation of undocumented migrants of only Mexican
descent.7 During the Great Depression, the U.S. deported
approximately 200,000 United States citizens of Mexican descent
during Operation Wetback because the government assumed they
were undocumented.8 Overall, the beginning of immigration law
began by denying “undesirable groups of people” from entering
the United States. Mexican and Latino noncitizens are—and
continue to be—targeted by broad and unforgiving deportation
laws.9
This should come at no shock—the United States’
weaponization of immigration law began long before the Trump
Administration. On August 18, 2021, the United States District
Court of Nevada in United States v. Carrillo-Lopez chose to
address the racial underpinnings of a deportation law that was
7

Mary Romero, Racial Profiling, and Immigration Law Enforcement:
Rounding Up of Usual Suspects in the Latino Community, 32 CRIT.
SOCIOL. 448, 450 (2006).
8
Asad, supra note 4.
9
Romero, supra note 7.
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enacted in 1952.10 In 1952, the 82nd Congress of the United States
enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) & (b) (“Section 1326”), which
criminalized any attempted unlawful re-entry to the United States
after deportation.11 Initially, courts followed a contextual approach
to interpret Section 1326 as facially neutral with a lack of animus
in its creation. However, in Carrillo-Lopez, Chief Judge Miranda
Du granted the defendant's motion to dismiss after finding
defendant demonstrated both a disparate impact and a
discriminatory intent of Section 1326 under Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (the
“Arlington Heights standard”).12
The Arlington Heights standard is a higher level of review
than typical in Equal Protection cases reviewing immigration
policy. Courts, such as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and
other jurisdictions, refuse to apply a more deferential standard of
review, like the Arlington Heights standard, to Section 1326 and
continue to review it under a rational basis.13 The United States
District Court of Nevada, however, correctly applied Arlington
Heights to interpret the legislative intent of Section 1326, and other
courts should adopt this reading as well as evaluate the prospective
and practical consequences of Section 1326 in immigration law.
A. Societal issues leading to the enactment of 8 U.S.C. § 1326
The criminalization of entry and re-entry to the United
States started in the 1920s when Congress began to close the

10

United States v. Carrillo-Lopez, No. 3:20-cr-00026-MMD-WGC, 2021
U.S. Dist. (D. Nev. Aug. 18, 2021).
11
8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1996).
12
Carrillo-Lopez, 2021 U.S. Dist. 155741 at 1.
13
See generally United States v. Bernal, No. 21-CR-01817-TWR, 2021
U.S. Dist. 178922, 1 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 20, 2021).
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country's open borders to certain classes of people.14 The United
States
already
denied
citizenship and
naturalization
to–primarily–black people and people of color (excluding freed
slaves), but Congress continued to bar non-white migration to the
United States by shifting its focus onto the United States-Mexican
border.15 At the time, many Mexican migrants traveled to the
United States for work due to an increased need for labor in World
War I. A shift in the agricultural business model in the 1920s
allowed Mexican laborers to stay year-round and bring their
families with them to the United States.16 During this period,
almost two-thirds of Mexican entry into the United States was
undocumented.17 In 1929, Congress enacted the Immigration and
Nationality Act, which made an unlawful entry—successful or
attempted—a misdemeanor offense to help immigration officials
enforce the law at the United States-Mexican border.18 In the same
legislation, Congress broadened prior re-entry bans from specific
groups of people previously deported to include all noncitizens,
primarily at the United States land borders.19

14

See Doug Keller, Re-thinking Illegal Entry and Re-entry, 44 LOY. U. CHI.
L. J. 65, 2012. See also Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 11, 26 Stat.
1084, 1086 (making deportable anyone who was excludable to begin
with); Quota Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, ch. 8, § 2, 42 Stat. 5 (where
Congress explicitly restricted immigration through quotas based on
national origin and race).
15
See 43 Stat. 153 (excluding entry to the United States to any
immigrant from any Asian country except Japan and the Philippines); see
also 22 Stat. 58., Chap. 126.
16
MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 50 (2004).
17
Id.
18
Supra note 14.
19
Id. (explaining how previous criminal re-entry laws focused on persons
deported for prostitution or anarchy).
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The Great Depression in the 1930s decreased the need for
labor due to a lack of employment opportunities.20 Immigration
officials forcibly removed more than one million people of
Mexican descent during this decade.21 Overall, only about 5,000
individuals a year were prosecuted under the new entry and
re-entry laws.22 In the 1940s, however, the need for labor rose
again, and Mexican noncitizens were invited to work in the United
States under the Bracero Program.23 This invitation back into the
United States was not extended with open arms. At this time,
United States citizens associated undocumented immigrants with
“misery, disease, crime, and many other evils.”24 Social scientists
found that white citizens saw no difference in local citizens of
Mexican descent with undocumented immigrants.25 Rhetoric of the
dangers of undocumented immigrants permeated society, and
political leaders perpetuated the stereotype.26
Congressional decisions and rhetoric against non-white
immigrants became largely noticeable on a world stage.27 The most
insidious example of this was when Adolf Hitler wrote in Mein
Kampf that Nazi Germany modeled their immigration laws after
U.S. immigration law.28 This (among other influences) led to
several reforms in the 1940s and 1950s in immigration law,
including the long-overdue repeal of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion
20

DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY
215 (2007).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Ngai, supra note 16, at 116.
24
Id. at 171.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Robert J. Miller, Nazi Germany’s Race Laws, the United States, and
American Indians 94 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 751, 780 (2021).
28
ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 439-40 (Ralph Manheim trans., 1971); see
also Robert J. Miller, Nazi Germany’s Race Laws, the United States, and
American Indians 94 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 751, 780 (2021) (citing OTTO
KOELLREUTTER, GRUNDRIFS DER ALLGEMEINEN STAATLEHRE 51-52 (1933)).
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Act in 1943.29 Almost a decade later, the 82nd Congress of the
United States convened to create the Immigration and
Naturalization Act of 1952 (“INA of 1952”), which still influences
contemporary immigration and naturalization law.30
In the INA of 1952, Congress eliminated racial
requirements for immigration and naturalization.31 The Act,
however, majorly overlooked other racially charged laws from
1929, such as deportation laws and quota systems that overtly
benefit European immigrants.32 Chapter 8 of the U.S. Code
codified “illegal entry” and “illegal re-entry” in Sections 1325 and
1326, respectively, without further consideration of racial animus
behind the 1929 legislation.33 President Truman vetoed the INA of
1952 due to concerns about the Act’s perpetuation of
discriminatory practices and created a committee to review the
implications of it.34
In 1953, the President’s Commission on Immigration and
Naturalization published a report entitled, “Whom We Shall
Welcome” (the “Report”). The Committee warned that American
deportation laws are “unreasonable” and deportation procedures
are “inadequate.”35 The Report illustrated that in 1949, 1950, and
1951, Mexican noncitizen deportation comprised 84%, 50%, and
29

Modern Immigration Wave Brings 59 Million to U.S., Driving Population
Growth and Change Through 2065, PEW RES. CTR. (September 28,
2015),
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2015/09/28/chapter-1-the-nations-i
mmigration-laws-1920-to-today/.
30
8 U.S.C. Ch. 12.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Message from the President of the United States to the House of
Representatives, 82d Cong., 98 CONG. REC. 8o82 (1952).
35
Whom we Shall Welcome: Report of the President’s Commission on
Immigration and Naturalization, July 1, 1953, at 194.
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65% of all deportations in those years, respectively.36 Additionally,
the report showed that a majority of deportations were not for
criminal misconduct but merely for entering without inspection or
proper documentation.37 The committee found the INA of 1952’s
use of deportation was “unnecessary and excessively severe” in
many cases.38 Regardless, Congress overrode President Truman’s
veto, and Section 1326 still governs illegal re-entry today.39
Since the INA of 1952, the use of deportation significantly
increased. In 1954, Congress authorized “Operation Wetback”
directly targeting undocumented Mexican immigrants. In all,
Immigration Services deported or acquired voluntary removal of
801,069 undocumented Mexican immigrants within two years.40
This trend continued throughout the decades. Within the 1950s,
fewer than 2,000 people were prosecuted for illegal entry or
re-entry.41 Then, beginning in the 1960s, the government
prosecuted around 10,000 people per year.42 The Clinton
Administration’s “tough-on-crime” approach to immigration
immediately followed by the Bush Administration’s immigration
enforcement campaign increased prosecution for unauthorized
entry, reaching 50,000 prosecutions in 2008.43 In 2018,
immigration offenses were the majority of federally prosecuted

36

Id. at 195
Id. at 196
38
Id. at 200-206
39
Alicia Campi, The McCarran-Walter Act: A Contradictory Legacy on
Race, Quotas, and Ideology, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (June 2004),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/B
rief21%20-%20McCarran-Walter.pdf.
40
Ngai, supra note 16, at 156.
41
Jesse Franzblau, A Legacy of Injustice: The U.S. Criminalization of
Migration, THE NAT’L IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CTR. (July 2020),
https://immigrantjustice.org/LegacyofInjustice.
42
Id.
43
Id.
37
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crimes.44 U.S. deportation laws have not changed in almost a
century, yet prosecution for these offenses exponentially increased
since Congress prohibited racial requirements for immigrants to
migrate and naturalize in the United States.45
B. Noncitizens’ constitutional protections and the Arlington
Heights standard
Over a century of case law affirms that the United States
Constitution affords noncitizens several rights while physically on
U.S. soil.46 Some rights are restricted to citizens only, but rights
referring to “persons” or “people” rather than “citizens” in the
Constitution are rights for all people in American jurisdiction.47
Some of these rights afforded to all people include the freedoms of
the First Amendment, protection against unreasonable search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the right to due process
under the Fifth Amendment, and the right to legal counsel under
44

Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2017-2018, Department of
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (April
2021), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs1718.pdf (noting that in 2018,
65% of all federal arrests were heard in five federal judicial districts along
the United States-Mexican border.). See also Prosecuting People for
Coming to the United States, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Aug. 23, 2021),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigration-prose
cutions (asserting that in 2017, prosecutions under Sections 1325 and
1326 doubled from 53,614 charges in 2018 to 91,896 charges. In 2019,
both laws reached peak prosecution at 106,312 total charges).
45
Prosecuting People for Coming to the United States, AM. IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL (Aug. 23, 2021),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigration-prose
cutions This publication also explains that in 2018, noncitizens made up
of a little under half of all prosecuted defendants in United States District
Courts. Additionally, 31% of all defendants of all crimes charged in all
United States District Courts were from Mexico.
46
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1932); Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
47
Id.
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the Sixth Amendment.48 In 1886, the Supreme Court additionally
held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments (“Equal Protection”) apply to all people in the United
States “without regard to differences of...nationality.”49
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment reads
“no person can be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process,” yet these protections are unclear in the context of
distinctions based on nationality or national origin.50 For example,
a citizen may never face deportation for criminal charges or other
egregious behavior, yet noncitizens can.51 The courts recognize this
difference in treatment as permissible and afford the federal
government considerable difference to uphold the “plenary power”
of the Executive Branch over immigration.52 This allows Congress
to make rules that would otherwise blatantly “violate a citizen’s
Constitutional rights.”53
The plenary power doctrine began as an absolute federal
power over borders and immigration law.54 Case law suggests two
reasons as to why political branches need plenary power of
immigration.55 The first rationale is that immigration power is a
sovereign right because international law grants unbridled power to
48

U.S. CONST. amend. I; Id. amend. IV; Id. amend. V; Id. amend. VI.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Id. amend. XIV; and Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at
238.
50
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). See also David Cole, Are
Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights As
Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367-88 (2003).
51
See generally Two Systems of Justice, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (March
2013),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/ai
c_twosystemsofjustice.pdf.
52
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
53
Mathews v. Eldridge, 426 U.S. 319 (1976).
54
Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 373, 384 (2004).
55
Id. at 384-385.
49

Page 10 of 29

countries to regulate their borders.56 The second rationale is that
the Constitution does afford the federal government unlimited
power over immigration through congressional and presidential
duties to international relations and national security.57 The courts
have affirmed and mixed both rationales frequently to create a
jurisprudence on non-justiciability “to a highly deferential standard
of review.”58 In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, the U.S. Supreme
Court afforded Congress an
almost absolute power over
immigration law when it held immigration statutes are “largely
immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”59
The Harisiades decision nearly converted immigration law
into a political question, but left the question open for future
interpretation. Ultimately, this question, however, has still not been
addressed in the twentieth century by the courts. In Kleindienst v.
Mandel, the Supreme Court affirmed Congress’ power to exclude
noncitizens because such power is “inherent in sovereignty,
necessary for...defending the country against foreign
encroachments and dangers—a power to be exercised exclusively
by the political branches of the government.”60 In United States v.
Hernandez-Guerrero, the defendant tried to narrow Congress’
power over immigration and the high deference it afforded. He
contended that Congress only possessed “sweeping” authority over
civil statutes regarding immigration and does not possess this same

56

Id. at 385.
Id. quoting The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609 (stating that
the power over immigration is "delegated by the constitution"). See also
See generally U.S. CONST. art. I §8 cl.18.; U.S. CONST. art. II §3.
58
Shalini Bhargava Ray, Plenary Power and Animus in Immigration Law
80 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 30 (2019).
59
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589, 72 S. Ct. 512, 519
(1952) (emphasis added).
60
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972), quoting The Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889), and in Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
57
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power in criminal law.61 The Court denied this contention by
finding that congressional control of immigration law pertains to
any type of law that promotes civil compliance with immigration
processes of the United States.62 Plenary power creates a
significant barrier for the judicial system to review immigration
decisions. Federally, the courts refuse to officially define the
standard of review it may use because it must permit considerable
deference.63
Within the past five years, however, courts began reviewing
federal immigration laws under a new standard of review. For
example, in Regents of the University of California v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Security, the Ninth Circuit held that judicial review
promotes accountability within the Executive Branch, and with
“substantially [great] evidence of discriminatory motivation,” a
heightened standard of review should apply.64 The Ninth Circuit
reviewed the precision of the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals Program (“DACA”) under the discriminatory intent
review laid out in Arlington Heights, finding that the plaintiff had a
valid Equal Protection claim.65 The Supreme Court affirmed that
Arlington Heights review may apply to immigration statutes.66

61

United States v. Hernandez-Guerrero, 147 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir.
1998), quoting Catholic Social Servs. v. Reno, 134 F.3d 921, 927 (9th Cir.
1998).
62
Hernandez-Guerrero, 147 F.3d. at 1077.
63
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); see also Trump v. Hawaii 138 S.
Ct. 2392 (2018) (the courts applied rational basis review when decided
the President may order travel bans to protect national security so it
could be assumed this is the correct standard of review for federal
alienage classification).
64
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
908 F.3d 476, 520 (9th Cir. 2018).
65
Id. at 522.
66
Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891
(2020).
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Regents created a new avenue to challenge broad—and
seemingly absolute—immigration laws at the source of their
creation rather than the application of those laws to individual
cases. Arlington Heights is slowly gaining acceptance within many
court systems as an acceptable review standard.67 Under this
standard, the moving party must prove (1) disparate impact; and
(2) that “racially discriminatory intent or purpose” was a
“motivating factor in the decision.”68 This standard allows the
court to look into the intent of a statute’s creation and its impact on
one insular community compared to others, rather than afford the
federal government almost unreviewable power.69
Though the courts are beginning to review immigration
statutes under Arlington Heights, moving parties are failing to meet
their burden.70 The issue that continues to arise is regarding the
“intent doctrine”. The idea of an intent doctrine in Equal Protection
jurisprudence began after cases like Brown v. Board of Education
where facially neutral lawmakers could still not be held legally
67

See generally Washington v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
No. 4:19-CV-5210-RMP, 2020 U.S. Dist. 251197, 1 (E.D. Wash. Sep. 14,
2020) (accepting Arlington Heights as an applicable standard of review
for the 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) new definition of who to exclude from
immigration status due to their likelihood to become a “public charge”);
United States v. Rios-Montano, No. 19-CR-2123-GPC, 2020 U.S. Dist.
230122, 13 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2020) (accepting Arlington Heights as an
acceptable standard of review for 8 U.S.C. § 1325); Ramos v. Wolf, 975
F.3d 872, 896 (9th Cir. 2020) (reaffirming Arlington Heights as a proper
standard of review for immigration decisions of noncitizens on American
soil).
68
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
69
Regents, 908 F.3d at 518-519; citing Village of Arlington Heights, 429
U.S. 252.
70
In cases such as United States v. Rios-Montano and Ramos v. Wolf,
the defendants failed to meet their burden under Arlington Heights. See
cases cited supra note 67. Washington v. United States Dep't of
Homeland Sec. and Regents sufficiently met its burden under Arlington
Heights to survive a motion to dismiss.
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accountable for racially charged statutes.71 In Washington v. Davis,
the Court famously held that “racially discriminatory
purpose”—not “racially disproportionate impact”—was the
standard demanded under Equal Protection.72 A year later,
Arlington Heights affirmed this demand and held that government
action with discriminatory results does not violate Equal Protection
unless discrimination was a “motivating factor.”73 Both Davis and
Arlington Heights made one legal decision very clear: courts
prioritized intent of discrimination over impact in reviewing
facially neutral government actions.
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney
further narrowed the intent doctrine by focusing on proving the
subjective willful action of the government.74 Such decisions were
a major blow to noncitizens’ Equal Protection rights. A narrow
scope of intent coupled with plenary power creates a
next-to-impossible standard to prove.75 Regents gave hope that the
Court was willing to finally review not only subjective intent, but
objective intent as well.76 This broadened scope of review was
desperately needed for any noncitizen to win a challenge under
Arlington Heights. However, Arlington Heights still poses an
71

Katie R. Eyer, Ideological Drift and the Forgotten History of Intent 51
HARV. C.R-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2016).
72
Id. at *50 quoting Washington v. Davis (the Court held that government
discrimination is only found within).
73
Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.at 264-265.
74
Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S. Ct. 2282,
2296 (1979) (the majority held that the government must have acted
‘because of’, not merely ‘in spite of’ its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.
75
Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 373, 383-386 (2004) (explaining that Equal Protection challenges in
immigration law are reviewable to an extent and do not fall under issues
of standing nor political questions).
76
William D. Araiza, Regents: Resurrecting Animus/Renewing
Discriminatory Intent 51 Seton Hall L. Rev. 983, 1021-1023.
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impossible form of Equal Protection review for migrants due to its
circular logic.
On June 16, 2021, The Virgin Islands District Court heard
United States v. Wence, in which defendant Wence argued that 8
U.S.C. § 1326 violated the Equal Protection Clause under
Arlington Heights.77 Though the court agreed that Arlington
Heights is an applicable standard of review for Section 1326, the
court ultimately found that the defendant did not meet his burden.78
The defendant focused on proving the original enactment of
Section 1326 violated Equal Protection in 1929. The court held
that the intent in 1929 was not applicable for review because
illegal re-entry was reenacted in 1952 without proof of
discriminatory intent.79 Importantly, the court did recognize that
“past discrimination does not flip the evidentiary burden on its
head,” and found that Section 1326 was motivated in part by a
discriminatory purpose.80 This, however, did not surmount to
enough evidence of discriminatory intent.81
Only two months later, the District Court for the District of
Oregon reviewed a similar challenge to Section 1326 in United
States v. Machic-Xiap.82 The court reviewed an extensive historical
record, finding that the Act of 1929 served “racist purposes” and
identified evidence of racism within the 1952 reenactment.83
Ultimately, the court held “strong and disconcerting” evidence of
racial animus in the enactment of several immigration laws was not
enough to show specific racial motivation to enact Section 1326,
77

United States v. Wence, No. 3:20-cr-0027, 2021 U.S. Dist. 112805, 2
(Dist.Vir.I. June 16, 2021).
78
Id. at 4
79
Id. at 11-14
80
Id., citing Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2325 (2018).
81
Id. at 28.
82
United States v. Machic-Xiap, No. 3:19-cr-407-SI, 2021 U.S. Dist.
145037 (D. Or. Aug. 3, 2021).
83
Id. at 32-33.
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nor impede upon the Executive Branch’s plenary power over
immigration.84
C. The Carrillo-Lopez Decision
As the District Courts of the Virgin Islands and Oregon
denied Equal Protection claims of both Wence and Machic-Xiap,
respectively, defendant Gustavo Carrillo-Lopez also submitted a
similar claim in the United States District Court of Southern
Nevada.85 Conversely, on August 18, 2021, two months after
Wence and less than one month after Machic-Xiap, Chief Judge Du
found for Carrillo-Lopez and granted his motion to dismiss under
Arlington Heights.86
The past half-decade crept around judicial review of
immigration statutes. Then, in 2021, the Carrillo-Lopez decision
officially addressed the issue. In the case, defendant Gustavo
Carrillo-Lopez was indicted on one count of illegal reentry after
deportation under Section 1326 in June of 2020.87 In litigation,
Carrillo-Lopez attacked Section 1326 for its racist history and
disproportionate impact on Mexican and Latino noncitizens.88 He
filed a motion to dismiss on Equal Protection grounds under the
standard in Arlington Heights, which was ultimately granted.89
The court affirmed the Arlington Heights standard,
following contemporary case law like Regent and Wolf.90 Unlike
other Section 1326 Equal Protection arguments, Carrillo-Lopez
presented comprehensive testimony that analyzed historical
background, the legislative and administrative history of Section
1326, Congress’ departure from normal procedure, and the
84
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disparate racial impact of the law.91 While past cases focused solely
on small pieces of historical context or legislative intent,
Carrillo-Lopez reviewed the larger problem of racism in American
immigration law by comprising several smaller pieces of evidence
together to show one larger picture of discrimination based on
race.92 Ultimately, the court held the government’s claims
unpersuasive for both prongs under Arlington Heights.93 Under the
disparate impact analysis, the court found that the geographic
location of Mexico and Latin countries' proportionality were not
valid reasons to discriminate.94 Under the intent prong, the court
found evidence that Section 1326 was not “cleansed” in 1952.95
The lack of debate over Section 1326, contemporary remarks and
actions by decision makers, and explicit concerns of the President
at the time proved that discrimination was a motivating factor in its
reenactment. 96
III.

Discussion
Judge Du delivered a decision in Carrillo-Lopez that is
unsurprisingly unpopular by critics. Unpopular decisions, however,
are not always bad decisions. Other courts should not be afraid to
follow Carrillo-Lopez precedent as the reasoning approaches the
legislative intent holistically. This decision created a functional
discriminatory intent review under Arlington Heights without
hindering the power of plenary power. However, the
Carrillo-Lopez decision can also be interpreted as a subtle nod to
judicial review of immigration decisions and encourage more
courts to hold the political branches of government accountable for
racially charged policy.
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A. Holistic Approach to Discriminatory Intent
Arlington Heights set a standard that, construed liberally,
provides several avenues of obtaining evidence in favor of proving
a moving party's contention.97 However, there are barriers to the
uniform application of this standard. First, the Supreme Court
made evidence of disparate impact useless on its own and pivoted
Equal Protection challenges to focus on discriminatory intent.98
Second, the Supreme Court has never defined “discriminatory
intent” and what that explicitly looks like.99 Third, the review of
discriminatory intent varies across different policy contexts,
especially within immigration. Additionally, the burden to prove
discriminatory purpose increases when the statute in review falls
under both legislative and executive’s plenary power, like
immigration.100
Regents painfully reminded the legal community just how
much deference the Supreme Court affords the Executive Branch
in immigration law.101 The Court found the termination of DACA
was arbitrary and capricious but not on the Equal Protection
challenge.102 Within the five paragraphs discussing Equal
Protection, the Court explained the evidence was insufficient to
97

Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.at 267-268. Here, the Court
explained that motivation can be proven by numerous factors, like the
historical background of the decision, departures from normal
procedures, legislative and administrative history, contemporary
statements by members of the decision-making body, and a specific
series of events leading up to the challenged action. The Court affirmed
that the factors listed in this decision are persuasive, but not exhaustive.
98
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Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
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find for an Equal Protection claim because the Court refused to
apply then-President Trump’s public ridicule of immigrants as
evidence of discriminatory intent and only considered evidence of
unusual history behind The Department of Homeland Security’s
decision to rescind DACA in its analysis.103 The Court ultimately
ended its discussion on Equal Protection by declining to consider
President Trump’s discriminatory remarks against Latinos as
“contemporary statements” probative of the decision at issue.104
This decision affirmed two contentions. First, the Court continues
to apply a holistic approach to discriminatory intent that
encompasses all factors the Arlington Heights decision allows.
Second, discriminatory intent is impossible to prove when the
Court provides an incredibly high allowance of deference in
immigration decisions.
Defendants raising Equal Protection challenges against
Section 1326 have been cognizant of this hesitation and attempt to
argue for judicial review due to an overwhelming amount of
evidence of animus. Wence, Machic-Xiap, and Carrillo-Lopez, the
district courts differed as to what similar presentations of evidence
showed.105 In Wence, the court held that Section 1326 was partially
motivated by racist motives, but that the reenactment in 1952
weakened the defendant’s argument.106 In Machic-Xiap, the court
found strong evidence that both the 1929 enactment of Section
1326 and the reenactment in 1952 served a racist purpose, yet
found the evidence was not strong enough to address the Executive
Branch’s plenary power.107 Then, in Carrillo-Lopez, the court
found that numerous pieces of evidence sufficiently composed a
larger picture of discriminatory intent in the enactment and
103
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reenactment of Section 1326.108 This inconsistent application of
Arlington Heights illuminates the confusion lower courts face
when reviewing immigration laws for discriminatory intent.
By ruling in favor of the defendant, the Carrillo-Lopez
court is in a slim minority. The court’s application of Arlington
Heights correctly establishes discriminatory intent, though critics
find this application negligent to the plenary power doctrine. The
deference the Judicial Branch affords the other branches of
government should not blind the courts to a prominent issue. Case
law shows an affirmative trend in the past century that America
affords Constitutional guarantees to noncitizens on American soil,
including the right to Equal Protection.109 However, when the
courts refuse to review legislative intent of re-enactment, like in
Wence,110 nor hold the legislature accountable even after finding
wrongdoing, like in Machic-Xiap, the judiciary abrogates its duty
to give noncitizens a complete right to Equal Protection.111 Instead,
the courts provide a “quasi-protection” that is inconsistent with
case law.112 The courts must find a way to assure Equal Protection
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principles equitably to an insular minority while balancing these
interest against the decisions of elected officials.113
A holistic, comprehensive approach to reviewing
discriminatory intent in an immigration context could help the
courts maneuver the space between the Equal Protection, Due
Process, and Plenary Power. The Carrillo-Lopez decision shows
that, when combined, smaller pieces of evidence (though
insufficient individually) may be sufficient to show blatant
discrimination.114 Though this review yielded a favorable opinion
for the defendant, the district court should have been able to make
its decision with more ease and less criticism. Courts should be
able to review intent under a more modern framework within
immigration law without fear of negating case law. Plenary power
over immigration law has ultimately led to racially motivated
statutes that remained unchecked for over a century.
A new vision of the intent doctrine must be explored for
immigration law. Washington v. Davis sharply severed the
importance of impact and emphasized determining intent.115 Intent
is wily and easily concealed, as seen in the government’s
arguments of “reenactment cleansing” for Section 1326.116 The
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United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (“a
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courts shy away from even considering what racist intent looks like
when not explicitly written down.117
However, this notion of racism as explicit retaliation is not
wholly accurate.118 The Carrillo-Lopez decision invoked a new era
of analysis by implying a discussion of systemic and implicit
racism. The opinion never clearly identified systematic and
implicit racism as a reason for its ruling, but this approach helps
show why Carrillo-Lopez came to such a different conclusion from
Wence. When reviewed through an implicit intention framework,
the Carrillo-Lopez decision logically proves racist intent in the
enactment of Section 1326, unlike the narrow approach in Wence.
A major theme of Equal Protection—and the Arlington
Heights decision—is the goal of protecting minorities who cannot
politically protect themselves.119 To achieve this, the court must
look beyond outward animus and look to subtle or implicit acts of
racism.120 In “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection,” the author
suggests that courts review the government’s conduct for its
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“cultural meaning.”121 Repression of racist expression attaches to
other decisions and conveys “symbolic messages to which the
culture attaches racial significance.”122 To identify conduct that is
intertwined with racist intent, the court must implement a holistic
review of other decisions. This will help display where racism
played an evident role in decision making.
Carrillo-Lopez
reviewed
the
evidence
that
comprehensively showed the symbolic meaning of Section 1326 to
Congress in 1952. To begin, Congress reviewed immigration laws
in 1952 likely because of ridicule on the world stage.123 Congress
likely attempted to repress racist thoughts and ideology due to
societal pressure; however, Carrillo-Lopez points out numerous
ways where these thoughts and feelings are exposed in other
decisions this Congress also made. For example, Congress
minimally discussed Section 1326 compared to “robust” debates
over several other immigration statutes.124 This silence is not
explicitly proof of racism or bias, but the Carrillo-Lopez decision
points to several other decisions made by the same members of
Congress that do show decisions motivated by racist beliefs,
implicit or explicit. First, the quota systems that Congress
maintained still marginally favored white-European countries.125
Second, President Truman’s veto and the committee report created
on the country’s immigration laws explicitly showed genuine
concern that Congress did not actually make immigration statutes
better, but instead reenacted “unreasonable” and “inadequate”
statutes.126 Still, even with the political branches in conflict,
Congress overrode Truman’s veto without any discussion of race
121
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the reasoning behind the harsh deportation laws.127 Ultimately, the
court in Carrillo-Lopez revealed several layers of implicit or subtle
racism that was not addressed by earlier decisions.
The Carrillo-Lopez decision paralleled the Arlington
Heights application regarding the 1929 enactment but approached
the 1952 reenactment analysis in a less traditional way. Opening a
review to a discussion of implicit and systematic racism would
help strengthen the logic Carrillo-Lopez used to prove racist
purpose for the reenactment of 1952. The usage of this factor,
however, is slim. Many courts are reluctant to analyze the
subconscious of politicians, especially in the immigration context.
The overarching issue in the Equal Protection review of
immigration laws stems, not from what factors courts review, but
from the plenary power doctrine that narrows the scope's
discretion.
B. Carrillo-Lopez’s Nod to Judicial Review in Immigration Law
The Carrillo-Lopez decision addressed a constitutional
issue within immigration law that other courts declined to review.
Cases such as Chae Chan Ping, Nishimura Ekiu, and Fong Yue
Ting established the precedent that immigration decisions are
wholly political and not for the courts to question.128 The courts’
127
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Provisions of S. 2550 Raised in White House Memorandum Truman
Library
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Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (the Court held that
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minimal involvement in immigration has resulted in numerous
racist immigration laws that are not afforded judicial review. This
deference allowed certain foreign nationals to obtain United States
citizenship while others were excluded from American soil
because their race was “undesirable.”129
The plenary power doctrine slowly engulfed immigration
law with hardly a protest from the courts. Within the past couple of
decades, the courts began to insert themselves more frequently and
apply semi-constitutional norms into immigration cases through
different avenues, like civil rights claims against removal.130 The
modern increase in judicial intervention, though more sympathetic
to noncitizens, is running up against a wall of plenary power case
law. With this barrier, the courts lack avenues of review and,
therefore, defer to the political branches.
In Carrillo-Lopez, the court opposed unbridled deference
towards legislative acts, which directly conflicts with the decision

the political branches of government may exercise its plenary power in
immigration in any way it seems fit without judicial review even when
immigration statutes would not be constitutional to citizens).
129
See generally Pub. L. No. 70-1018, ch. 690, § 2, 45 Stat. 1551
(“Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929”). See also 69th Cong. Rec., pg. 2818
(where House Representative John Box, an outspoken support of the
Undesirable Alien Act, said, “One purpose of our immigration laws is to
prevent the lowering of the ideals and the average of our citizenship…the
weakening of the Nation’s powers of cohesion, resulting from the
intermixing of differing races. The admission of 75,000 Mexican peons
annually tends to aggravate this, another evil which the laws are
designed to prevent or cure.”).
130
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE LAW
JOURNAL 545, 564 (1990). The phenomena of semi-constitutional
decisions, otherwise known as “phantom norms” was the court's way of
interjecting constitutional norms to inform statutory interpretation, which
were not actually applied because of the plenary power doctrine.

Page 25 of 29

in Mandel.131 This is not inappropriate since contemporary case
law chips away at the idea that deference is absolute against the
legislature. Regents, for example, upheld the notion that Equal
Protection claims against immigration statutes are judicially
reviewable.132 However, to effectively review these challenges, the
courts must be afforded a greater ability to review constitutional
claims by noncitizens.
Cases like Chae Chan Ping, Ekiu, and Fong Yue Ting are
continuously cited to uphold plenary power, yet rarely cited to
emphasize what happens when political power goes unchecked.
History repeats and contemporary plenary power illustrates this.
Recent Executive Administrations and sessions of Congress
exemplify the government’s unbridled ability to implement
unreviewable, facially neutral policies that create lasting harm to
Mexican and Latino noncitizens.
On May 7, 2018, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
implemented a “zero-tolerance” policy (the “Policy”) towards any
noncitizen that crossed a border into the United States illegally.
This policy allowed the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) and DOJ to enforce deportation proceedings against any
person not in the U.S. legally, even if claiming asylum.133 The
131
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Policy significantly broadened the power of US attorneys’ offices
to criminally prosecute migrants at the border that enter without
U.S. authorization. Ultimately, the past administrations authorized
harmful policies for prosecuting illegal entry and reentry, like
Operation Streamline, but Trump’s “zero-tolerance” policy
increased penalization for asylum seekers and parents traveling
with children.134
The residual effect of the Policy has been devastating.
More than 3,900 children were separated before the Policy was
revoked by the Biden Administration in 2021.135 Less than half of
these children have been recorded as reunited with their families to
date.136 One of the most startling issues within the Policy is the
lack of accountability.137 The 115th and 116th Congressional
Sessions introduced several immigration bills to aid in family
the detention of asylum seekers, which may impede the asylum-seekers
ability to retain appropriate counsel and spend sufficient time working on
their case.
134
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reunification, yet none saw congressional action.138 In fact, in the
middle of family separation actions, there were multiple bills
introduced to further increase immigration enforcement and child
detainment.139
The Policy demonstrated a powerful imbalance in the
political powers’ ability to check each other. Judicial review would
aid in the equal enforcement of immigration law because cases like
Chae Chan Ping reveal plenary power’s dangerous ability to
mistreat and harm powerless communities in the political process.
The decision of Carrillo-Lopez, ultimately, asserts itself firmly on
the side of constitutional intervention and affirming rights to
noncitizens while on American soil.
Conclusion
Discrimination in immigration law has been called
“segregation’s last stronghold”.140 The history of racism within the
United States is sharply illustrated in immigration cases and
statutes. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1889 illuminated the
animosity Americans had towards non-Western European people,
and the Zero Tolerance Policy in 2018 reveals that not much
changed in the past two centuries. The United States District Court
of Nevada in United States v. Carrillo-Lopez addressed the animus
of Congress towards Mexican and Latin American noncitizens
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both in 1929 and in 1952 when it found Section 1326
unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds.
The decision in Carrillo-Lopez is not controlling, nor does
it change precedent within immigration law. ICE continues to
criminally charge and deport foreign nationals who re-enter the
United States illegally after original removal proceedings.
However, Carrillo-Lopez affords hope in an area of law that seems
impossible to change and aligns with contemporary Equal
Protection jurisprudence. The district court took Village of
Arlington to new “heights” to afford noncitizens protections
already guaranteed in prior case law. Other courts should adopt this
reading and evaluate the prospective and practical consequences of
Section 1326 in immigration law.
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